（上海立信會計EON4講座）
報告人：安永紅
時間：2019年7月3號周三下午1點
地點：浦東校區第五教學樓404室
主題: Government Procurement, Market Power, and Consumer Welfare: Empirical Evidence from the Infant Formula Market
報告人簡介：
安永紅，美國約翰·霍普金斯大學經濟學博士，現為美國德州農工大學經濟系副教授（終身教職）🐘📕。主要研究領域為計量經濟學𓀄🔅，產業組織以及應用經濟學，研究課題包括計量方法在拍賣、契約合同、電子市場、醫療保險👩🏻、央行決策以及公共產品等方面的應用，研究主要集中在個人在復雜且具有風險環境下的決策過程。曾獲哈爾濱工業大學航天海鷹獎學金⛳️，清華大學光華獎學金，約翰·霍普金斯大學優秀博士生獎學金，德州農工大學經濟系優秀博士生授課教授以及優秀博士生導師稱號🍬。曾在《Journal of Econometrics》、《Journal of Business & Economic Statistics》👩🏻🦱、《RAND Journal of Economics》等頂級學術期刊發表論文12篇👩🏼💼、工作論文7篇。受邀為Applied Economics, Biometrics, Economic Modelling, Econometric Reviews, Economics Letters,Games and Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Journal of Econometrics, Journal of Industrial Economics, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Review of Economic Studies, Sinica Statistica等雜誌匿名評審。
報告內容簡介🙏🏼：
In the U.S. infant formula market, over one-half of the total sales are through the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program sponsored by USDA. The three major manufacturers (Abbott, Mead Johnson, and Nestle) compete in both non-WIC and WIC markets, and they bid a rebate of their national wholesale prices to serve WIC participants exclusively on the state level. Motivated by the fact that rebates are more than 80% of wholesale prices, we investigate how WIC (1) affects manufacturers' pricing strategies and leads to the substantial gap between the wholesale prices and the after-rebate prices, and (2) distorts the prices paid by the non-WIC consumers.
We find that manufacturers' marginal costs are much higher than what they charge for the WIC program. Nevertheless, winning a WIC contract is beneficial because serving WIC participants has a substantial spillover effect (increasing 31% of the demand from nonparticipants), and the manufacturer's loss from WIC participants are subsidized by the increased prices for nonparticipants. We further conduct counterfactual analyses to investigate the impacts of the competitive bidding of WIC program on non-WIC consumers. Our results show that WIC's competitive bidding increases prices of infant formula for non-WIC consumers.
在美國的嬰兒配方奶粉市場🏌🏼♀️，有超過一半的銷售額是由農業部實施的“婦女、嬰兒和兒童計劃”（WIC計劃）來資助的🧖🏼♀️。3個主要的製造商（雅培💌、美贊臣和雀巢）同時在WIC計劃和非WIC計劃市場開展競爭🧑🍼，他們依照全國批發價來對WIC計劃市場的折扣價進行競標，由於折扣超過批發價高達80%🎅，本研究考察如下問題：（1）WIC計劃如何影響奶粉製造商的定價策略並導致了高額折扣。（2）WIC計劃對非WIC計劃市場奶粉價格的扭曲效應。
研究結果發現：奶粉製造商的邊際成本遠高於其向WIC計劃的報價，但贏得WIC計劃合同還會帶來好處🥿，原因是WIC計劃參與者的購買具有溢出效應（非WIC計劃參與者的需求會因此增加31%）；奶粉製造商因WIC計劃的損失可由沒有參與該計劃的消費者所付的高價予以補貼。進一步進行反事實分析來探究廠商的WIC計劃競價對非WIC計劃消費者的影響，結果發現其提升了非WIC計劃消費者的配方奶價格🙍🏿♂️🦹🏿♀️。
歡迎廣大師生積極參加!
國際經貿EON4序倫書院
2019年6月21日